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Thompson: Constitutionalizing the Environment

ARTICLE

CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE ENVIRONMENT:
THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF MONTANA'S
ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS
Barton H. Thompson, Jr.*

The United States Constitution relies primarily on
institutional design and process to ensure that the government
pursues wise public policy. By contrast, virtually all state
constitutions set out a myriad of policy-specific directives to the
legislature. Historically, these directives have addressed state
taxes and budgetary issues, public education, state school lands,
corporate policy, employment relationships, and public utilities.
Some state constitutions, again unlike the United States
Constitution, have awarded various affirmative rights - e.g., the
right to a quality education - that require legislative action.
The rise of environmentalism in the United States during
the second half of the twentieth century brought a call for
"constitutionalizing" the environment. Prior to the first Earth
Day in 1970, Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin proposed an
amendment to the United States Constitution that would have
recognized in every person an "inalienable right to a decent
environment" and required both the federal and state
* Vice Dean and Robert E. Paradise Professor of Natural Resources Law, Stanford Law
School; Senior Scholar, Stanford Institute for International Studies.
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governments to "guarantee" that right.1 Nelson's proposal and
numerous other efforts to add an environmental right to the
United States Constitution have failed, in part because an
affirmative environmental guarantee seems inconsistent with
the limited nature of the federal constitution and its existing
provisions.
States, by contrast, took quickly to the idea of adding the
environment to the affirmative rights and substantive directives
already found in their constitutions. More than a third of all
state constitutions, including all written since 1959, address
2
modern concerns of pollution and resource preservation.
Montana's 1972 Constitution illustrates this trend. The "right
to a clean and healthful environment" literally leads the list of
"inalienable rights" set out in Article II, Section 3. The Montana
Constitution also sets out a number of specific environmental
directives in Article IX ("Environment and Natural Resources"),
which tellingly comes before "Education and Public Lands"
(Article X), albeit immediately after "Revenue and Finance"
(Article VIII).
Such environmental provisions have had little consequence
in most of the states that have adopted them. The passage of
strong federal and state environmental laws beginning in the
early 1970s has reduced the potential importance of the
constitutional provisions in most contexts. A surprisingly small
number of environmental lawsuits have invoked the state
constitutional provisions and, even in those lawsuits, the
constitutional arguments often have been secondary to the
plaintiffs' statutory claims. State courts also have helped ease
most of the constitutional provisions into relative obscurity by
holding that the provisions are not self-executing, by denying
standing to private citizens and groups trying to enforce the
provisions, or by establishing relatively easy standards for
meeting the constitutional requirements.
Although it is
empirically difficult to determine whether the constitutional
provisions may have had a more indirect effect on state
environmental policy (e.g., by emphasizing to administrators
and bureaucrats the critical importance of protecting the
1. S.J. Res. 169, 91st Cong. (2d Sess. 1970) ("Every person has the inalienable
right to a decent environment. The United States and every state shall guarantee this
right.").
2. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions:
The PotentialRole of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERs L.J. 863, 871 (1996) (discussing
state adoption of environmental policy provisions).
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environment), some states with the weakest environmental
policies have constitutional provisions affirming the importance
of the environment, while none of the five states with the
strongest environmental policies and programs 3have any
environmental policy provisions in their constitutions.
For the first quarter century after the people of Montana
passed the 1972 Constitution, its environmental provisions
seemed headed for the same ignoble obscurity. 4 In the last
several years, however, the Montana Supreme Court has broken
league with other state supreme courts and taken an activist
In Montana Environmental
approach to the provisions.
5
Information Center v. Department of Environmental Quality,
the court held that the constitutional provisions subject state
legislation that risks environmental degradation to strict
scrutiny. Two years later in Cape-FranceEnterprises v. Estate
of Peed,6 the Montana Supreme Court suggested that the
provisions also directly restrict private actions that would lead
to environmental harm.
The Montana Supreme Court's new activism provides an
opportunity to consider how state courts might use
constitutional provisions to promote the environmental goals
that they embody. A number of prior articles have considered
whether state constitutions should contain environmental policy
provisions 7 and, where such provisions exist, whether courts
should treat them as self-executing. 8 I start with the proposition

3. Id. at 892-893, 925 tbl. 5 (comparing the environmental policy ranking of
states, as determined by the 1991-92 Green Index, with whether the states' constitutions
contained environmental policy provisions).
4. See, e.g., Kadillak v. Anaconda Co., 184 Mont. 127, 138, 602 P.2d 147, 154
(1979) (environmental provisions in the Montana Constitution do not mandate an
environmental impact statement); Mont. Power Co. v. Mon. Dep't of Pub. Serv.
Regulation, 218 Mont. 471, 709 P.2d 995 (1977) (state EPA could issue permit for hardrock mining without conducting preconstruction review).
5.
1999 MT 248, 63, 296 Mont. 207, 63, 988 P.2d 1236, 63.
6. 2001 MT 139, T 32, 305 Mont. 513, 32, 29 P.3d 1011, 32.
7. See, e.g., J. B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why
Proposed Environmental Quality Amendments Don't Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 245 (1999) (arguing that environmental policy provisions are neither wise nor
practical); Thompson, supra note 2 (concluding that only limited goals and situations
justify environmental policy provisions); John C. Tucker, Constitutional Codification of
an EnvironmentalEthic, 52 FLA. L. REV. 299 (2000).
8. See, e.g., John L. Horwich, Montana's Constitutional Environmental Quality
Provisions: Self-Execution or Self-Delusion?, 57 MONT. L. REV. 323 (1996) (arguing that
the Montana provisions are not self-executing); Cameron Carter & Kyle Karinen, Note, A
Question of Intent: The Montana Constitution, Environmental Rights, and the MEIC
Decision, 22 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 97 (2001) (defending the implicit holding
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that the Montana constitutional provisions, whether advisable
or not, are self-executing and ask how the Montana Supreme
Court might then wield this powerful instrument. In what type
of situations are the constitutional provisions likely to be raised?
What standards should the courts use in applying the
provisions? What problems will the applications raise? The
answers to these questions, of course, shed light back onto the
questions that I will begin by ignoring: should the 1972 Montana
Constitution have included broad environmental provisions, and
should the Montana Supreme Court treat them as selfexecuting?
Part I of this Article provides general background on
environmental policy provisions in state constitutions, including
the Montana Constitution. Part I also includes an overview of
how the Montana Supreme Court has interpreted the Montana
provisions to date. Part II then examines how environmental
groups and interested citizens may try to use the environmental
provisions in future cases and asks the tough questions that the
Montana Supreme Court will need to face in those cases. With
both the opportunities and problems of "constitutionalizing" the
environment in mind, Part III briefly concludes by reconsidering
fundamental
wisdom
of including
self-executing
the
environmental policy provisions in a state constitution.

I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE
A. State EnvironmentalProvisions
All state constitutions drafted since 1959 address modern
concerns of pollution and preservation. Half a dozen states with
pre-1960 constitutions also have amended their constitutions to
address modern environmental issues. In total, more than a
third of all state constitutions now contain environmental policy
provisions.
These provisions vary enormously. The provisions differ
first in their functional purposes. At the weak end, two state
constitutions simply give the legislature the authority to enact
environmental legislation - an authorization with little, if any,
practical significance given the inherent police power of state
governments. 9 The Georgia Constitution, for example, provides

of the Montana Supreme Court that the provisions are self-executing).
9. See, e.g., Hayes v. Howell, 308 S.E.2d 170, 176 (Ga. 1983) (noting that
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that the "General Assembly shall have the power to provide by
law for . . . [r]estrictions upon land use in order to protect and
preserve the natural resources, environment, and vital areas of
this state."'10
Four states go a slight step further and set out a
constitutional policy to protect the environment. The Virginia
Constitution, for example, provides not only that the General
Assembly "may undertake" various environmental measures,"
but that it is the "policy of the Commonwealth to conserve,
develop, and utilize its natural resources" and "to protect its
atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollution."1 2 The Puerto
Rico Constitution similarly declares that it is the "public policy
of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop and use its natural
resources in the most effective manner possible for the general
welfare of the community." Not surprisingly, state courts have
concluded that such provisions are not self-executing and do not
require either state or private parties to take any particular
actions. 13
Most of the state constitutions that contain environmental
provisions go considerably further and award environmental
rights to their citizens, require the legislature to address
particular environmental issues, or both. The constitutions of a
number of southern states, as well as Michigan and New York,
mandate
environmental
legislation,
but
set out no
1
4
environmental rights. The Massachusetts Constitution creates
a right "to clean air and water," among other environmental
amenities, but then merely awards its legislature the "power to
15
enact legislation necessary or expedient to protect such rights."
The constitutions
of Hawaii,
Illinois, Montana, and
Pennsylvania both establish rights and call for state action to
support those rights.16
environmental legislation would be legitimate exercise of state police power even absent
constitutional provision).
10.

GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para. II(a)(1).

See also R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16

(providing that environmental regulation "shall be an exercise of the police powers of the
state, shall be liberally construed, and shall not be deemed to be a public use of private
property").
11. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (emphasis added).
12. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
13. See, e.g., Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 324 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Va. 1985).
14. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7; LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52;
N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4; S.C. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
15. MASS. CONST. amend. XLIX.
16. See HAw. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7, 9; ILL. CONST. art XI, §§ 1-2; MONT. CONST.
art. IX, §§ 1-3; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. The New Mexico Constitution similarly states
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These more substantive constitutional provisions vary
across a number of dimensions. First, the provisions differ in
how specifically they set out environmental goals. Most of the
constitutional provisions, including those of the Montana
Constitution, focus broadly on the need for a "clean" or
"healthful" environment or the protection of scenic beauty and
natural resources, sometimes with a list of illustrative examples.
Some of the constitutional provisions, however, set out explicit
but circumscribed lists of environmental directives or rights that
differ considerably from state to state. The lists include clean
air and water, noise abatement, wildlife preservation, protection
and conservation of other specific natural resources, and
maintenance of historic buildings and sites.
These constitutional provisions also vary in the degree to
which they recognize competing values. Most state constitutions
encourage the pursuit of environmental goals with no explicit
recognition of potential tradeoffs. Some state constitutions
require the legislature to pursue both environmental and
The
developmental goals, implicitly recognizing a balance.
need
both
to
emphasizes
the
for
example,
Constitution,
Hawaii
protect the state's natural resources and to "promote the
development and utilization of these resources in a manner
consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the selfsufficiency of the State." 17 A few state constitutions place
explicit limits on the degree to which the legislature can pursue
environmental ends. The Louisiana Constitution, for example,
mandates a "healthful" environment but only "insofar as
possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of
the people."' 8
Finally, constitutions differ in the degree to which they
permit ordinary citizens to seek judicial enforcement of these
The vast majority of the constitutions are
provisions.
conspicuously silent about enforcement, perhaps because the
framers assumed that courts would use standard rules of
constitutional interpretation to determine how and when
citizens could enforce the provisions .9 Of those constitutions

that environmental protection is of "fundamental importance to the public interest," and
orders the legislature to control pollution and despoilment of the environment. N.M.
CONST. art. XX, § 21 (emphasis added).
17. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
18. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
19. For a more general discussion of the self-execution of state constitutional
provisions, see David M. Gareau, Opening the Courthouse Doors: Allowing a Cause of
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that mandate legislative action without creating separate
environmental rights, only the New York Constitution explicitly
addresses enforcement - authorizing citizens to sue on notice to
the state attorney general and with the consent of the state's
supreme court. 20 Of the five constitutions that create rights or
duties in their citizenry, only the Hawaii and Illinois
constitutions explicitly authorize citizens to enforce the rights in
court against the government or private parties, and even these
states permit the legislature to impose "reasonable limitations"
on such lawsuits. 2 1 The remaining three constitutions, including
the Montana Constitution, are silent on whether and how
22
citizens can enforce the environmental rights.
Despite the many differences among these provisions,
environmental groups and individual citizens have found it
extremely difficult to use the provisions to affect environmental
policy.
Courts occasionally have interceded in relatively
extreme situations where state agencies, without any
consideration of the environmental consequences of their
actions, have pursued actions that posed an environmental
threat. For this reason, the provisions were of some value in the
1970s before most state legislatures passed laws constricting
state actions that might harm the environment and requiring
state agencies to conduct environmental assessments prior to
acting. Most state courts, however, have rebuffed efforts to use
the constitutional provisions to direct either governmental policy
or private actions. 23 As a result, such constitutional provisions
today play at best a marginal role in most states.
State courts have used a number of different legal
arguments to avoid "constitutionalizing" environmental policy.
Some of the arguments have been procedural. Where state
constitutions are silent regarding judicial enforcement, for
Action to Arise Directly from a Violation of the Ohio Constitution, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
459, 477-84 (1995).
20. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 5 ("A violation of any of the provisions of this article
may be restrained at the suit of the people or, with the consent of the supreme court in
appellate division, on notice to the attorney-general at the suit of any citizen.").
21. The Hawaii Constitution, for example, provides that "[any person may enforce
this right against any party, public or private, through appropriate legal proceedings,
subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law." HAW. CONST. art.
XI, § 9. See also ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
22. Both the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania constitutions also are silent
regarding enforcement, despite setting out explicit constitutional rights. See MASS.
CONST. art. XCVII, § 1; PA. CONST., art. I, § 27.
23. See Robert A. McLaren, Environmental Protection Based on State
ConstitutionalLaw: A Call for Reinterpretation, 12 U. HAW. L. REV. 123, 128-45 (1978).
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example, some courts have held that there is no cause of action
under the constitutional provisions. 24 Even where constitutions
provide explicitly for citizen enforcement, courts often have used
standing or ripeness principles to dismiss lawsuits challenging
25
state or private actions.
A common justification for dismissing private lawsuits has
'26
been that the constitutional provisions are not "self executing.
To most courts, a key question in deciding whether an
environmental provision is self-executing is whether the
provision sets out a sufficient rule by which to decide cases
without any legislative guidance. 27 As discussed later, most
state courts have felt very uncomfortable determining the
appropriate methodology and standards for evaluating
environmental issues such as the permissible level of pollution
or appropriate land uses.
State courts also have narrowly interpreted the scope of
environmental provisions.
Some courts have restricted the
applicability of constitutional provisions to a narrow set of
issues. In Glisson v. City of Marion,28 for example, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the term "healthful environment"
addresses only those actions such as polluting that might
directly harm human health and does not permit suits seeking
to protect biodiversity.
Other courts have held that
administrative actions are entitled to strong deference or have
established evaluative standards that are easy for state or
private actors to meet. 29 In evaluating the constitutionality of
state legislation, virtually every state court to consider the issue
has employed a reasonableness standard, refusing plaintiffs'
24. See, e.g., State v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 448 So. 2d 1074, 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984), affd, 469 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1985) (individual state attorney did not have authority
under constitutional provision to challenge creation and modification of artificial
waterways).
25. See, e.g., City of Elgin v. County of Cook, 660 N.E.2d 875, 891 (Ill. 1995)
(standing required to bring suit under constitutional provision); Parsons v. Walker, 328
N.E.2d 920, 924-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (lawsuit dismissed as premature); Enos v. Sec'y
Envt'l Affairs, 731 N.E.2d 525, 532 n.7 (Mass. 2000) (constitutional provision does not
provide separate standing).
26. See, e.g., Advisory Op. to the Gov'r, 706 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. 1997)
(environmental amendment to Florida constitution not self-executing); Petition of
Highway US-24, 220 N.W.2d 416 (Mich. 1974); County of Delta v. Michigan Dept. of Nat.
Resources, 325 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Assn. v.
Dion, 320 N.W.2d 668 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
27. See, e.g., Advisory Op. to the Gov'r, 706 So.2d at 281 (Fla. 1997), citing Gray v.
Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1960).
28. 720 N.E.2d 1034 (Ill. 1999).
29. See, e.g., Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
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30
requests to apply strict scrutiny.
Three of the five state constitutions that establish
environmental rights also appear to impose private duties on
citizens to protect the environment. Illinois and Montana are
the most explicit. The Illinois Constitution provides that "the
duty of each person is to provide and maintain a healthful
' 31
environment for the benefit of this and future generations,
while the 1972 Montana Constitution, as discussed below,
establishes a duty to "maintain and improve a clean and
healthful environment."32 Although the Hawaii Constitution
does not explicitly set out an environmental duty, its
enforcement language, by authorizing suits against "any party,
public or private," suggests that the environmental duties
extend to private individuals. 33 Neither the Hawaii nor Illinois
courts, however, have used the provisions in their constitutions
to scrutinize and regulate private actions. Indeed, the Illinois
appellate courts have suggested that the Illinois provision does
not create an independent cause of action against private
parties. 34

B. The 1972 Montana Constitution
1. The ConstitutionalProvisions
When the delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional
Convention turned their attention to the environment, they
concluded that the environmental provisions in other state
constitutions were insufficient to provide the type of protection
that the delegates believed was necessary. 35 The provisions that
they drafted are, in many ways, still at the cutting edge of
constitutional provisions protecting the environment.
Only
Montana, for example, labels as "inalienable" the "right to a
30. See, e.g., Ill. Pure Water Comm. v. Dir. of Pub. Health, 470 N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ill.
1984) (using reasonableness standard to review statute requiring mandatory fluoridation
of public water supply).
31. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
32. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1. In section 3 of Article II, after establishing the
"right to a clean and healthful environment," the 1972 Montana Constitution also notes
that "[i]n enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding responsibilities."
33. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
34. See Morford v. Lensey Corp., 442 N.E.2d 933 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (constitutional
duty does not give tenants a cause of action against their landlords for unhealthful
premises).
35.

5 MONT. CONST. CoNV. TR. 1200.
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clean and healthful environment. 3 6
As noted, moreover,
Montana is one of only two states to impose a duty on each and
every citizen to protect that environment. Finally, Montana is
one of only three states to recognize the environmental interests
37
of not only the current population but "future generations."
The Montana constitutional provisions also set out a more
nuanced set of standards than other state constitutions. Most
state constitutions tend to provide for the blanket protection of a
"healthful environment" or a laundry list of environmental
interests such as clean air, clean water, and noise abatement.
The 1972 Montana Constitution, by contrast, sets up several
standards. First, the Constitution provides a strict standard of
protection for those elements of the environment required to
protect human life. Section 3 of Article II thus provides an
inalienable right to a "healthful" environment. Section 1(3) of
Article IX, moreover, mandates that the legislature "provide
adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life
support system from degradation."
Second, the Constitution suggests, in both Articles II and
IX, that there is also a relatively strict obligation to provide a
"clean" environment. Whether the Constitution mandates a
totally pollution-less environment is not clear from the language
of the Constitution by itself. What is clear, however, is that the
Constitution demands more than the mere preservation of the
current level of environmental quality. Almost unique among
state constitutions, the Montana Constitution provides not only
for maintenance of current environmental quality but for the
improvement of the environment. Section 1(1) of Article IX
creates a duty in both the state and each person to "improve" the
environment for the benefit of present and future generations.
Section 2(1) of the same article provides that all "lands
disturbed by the taking of natural resources shall be reclaimed."
Finally, the Constitution provides a lower standard of
protection for those natural resources that are not essential for
life.
Section 1(3) of Article IX thus mandates that the
legislature provide adequate remedies only "to prevent
unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources."

36. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
37. See MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1, cl.1 ("The state and each person shall maintain
and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future
generations.")(emphasis added). The other states that explicitly recognize the interests
of future generations are Hawaii and Illinois. See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ILL. CONST.

art. XI, § 1.
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The Constitution does not attempt to define "unreasonable."
2. JudicialInterpretation
In the years immediately following passage of the 1972
Montana Constitution, the Montana Supreme Court, much like
other state courts, pursued a conservative interpretation of the
Constitution's environmental provisions. The court summoned
the environmental provisions when necessary to help uphold
state actions protecting or improving the environment, but
eschewed efforts to use the environmental provisions to
38
challenge actions harming the environment. Douglas v. Judge
exemplified the court's use of the provisions to support
governmental action. In Douglas, a property owner challenged
the constitutionality of a state law that used bond financing to
provide loans and grants for the development of "renewable
resources." The plaintiff argued that the law authorized the
levying of taxes for a private purpose in violation of Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1972 Montana Constitution. In rejecting the
challenge, the court relied on the Constitution's environmental
provisions: "In view of the mandate of Article IX, §1, 1972
Montana Constitution that: 'The state and each person shall
maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in
Montana for present and future generations,' we feel the
purpose of this act is a 'public purpose.'
When asked to hold that the Constitution required a full
and adequate environmental review of subdivision plans before
they were approved, however, the Supreme Court declined. The
subdivision at issue in Montana Wilderness Association v. Board
of Health & Environmental Sciences,40 required the approval of
both local governments (as to land use) and the Department of
Health and Environmental Sciences (as to the water and sewer
systems).
The Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA)
required state, but not local, agencies to prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS) before taking any major
action that might significantly affect the human environment.
Although the Department had prepared an EIS, two
environmental groups claimed that it was inadequate;
defendants, in turn, challenged the groups' standing.
Originally, the court authored an opinion siding with the
38.
39.
40.

174 Mont. 32, 568 P.2d 530 (1977).
174 Mont. at 36, 568 P.2d at 532-33.
171 Mont. 477, 559 P.2d 1157 (1976).
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plaintiffs. The court held that the plaintiffs had standing
because the alleged failure to prepare an adequate EIS
"threatened injury to a civil right of the Associations' members,
right to a clean and healthful
that is, the 'inalienable ...
environment."' 4 1 According to the court, the inalienable right to
a clean and healthful environment "certainly places the issue of
unlawful environmental degradation within the judicial
cognizance." 42 In passing, the court also held that the right to a
43
clean and healthful environment was a "fundamental" right.
After reconsidering its original decision, however, the court
changed course and issued a new, somewhat confused opinion
holding that the local governments could approve the
44
subdivision despite the challenge to the Department's EIS.
In Kadillak v. Anaconda Company, 45 property owners
challenged the development and operation of a mining waste
dump in their neighborhood, again attacking the adequacy of
the state's EIS. The Supreme Court held that MEPA did not
require the state to conduct an EIS for the mining activity
because MEPA required the preparation of an EIS only "to the
fullest extent possible." Because state law required a mining
permit to be issued within 60 days of an application, a "woefully
inadequate period for the preparation of a proper EIS," the court
concluded that an EIS was not possible. 46 Although the
plaintiffs argued that the court should give MEPA a liberal
interpretation in light of the environmental rights established
by the 1972 Montana Constitution, the court unanimously
declined, noting that MEPA had been passed prior to the
Constitution. "This Court finds that the statutory requirement
of an EIS is not given constitutional status by the subsequent
enactment of this constitutional guarantee ...
It is not the
function of this Court to insert into a statute 'what has been
47
omitted."'
For the next twenty years, the environmental provisions in
the Montana Constitution were quiescent. In 1999, however,
the Montana Supreme Court breathed new life into the

41. 171 Mont. at 497, 559 P.2d at 1167 (Haswell, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. 171 Mont. at 498, 559 P.2d at 1168 (Haswell, J., dissenting).
44. 171 Mont at 482-86, 559 P.2d at 1160-61.
45. 184 Mont. 127, 602 P.2d 147 (1979).
46. 184 Mont. at 134-36, 602 P.2d at 152-53.
47. 184 Mont. at 138, 602 P.2d at 154, (quoting Security Bank v. Connors, 170
Mont. 59, 67, 550 P.2d 1313, 1317 (1976)).
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provisions, creating an exceptionally strong legal tool for
environmentalists seeking to challenge governmental or private
actions that potentially threaten the environment. 48 The issue
in Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of
Environmental Quality49 (MEIC) was the constitutionality of an
exemption from Montana's policy of preventing the degradation
of high quality waters. A mining venture known as Seven-Up
Pete sought to discharge arsenic-laced groundwater that it was
pumping from several test wells into two infiltration galleries
that fed the Blackfoot River and the Landers Fork River.
Although the arsenic levels in the groundwater exceeded not
only the background levels of the infiltration galleries but also
state health standards, the arsenic levels would drop by the time
the water reached the rivers. State experts testified that the
level of arsenic in the rivers would be below human health
standards and not interfere with any human uses of the rivers.
The arsenic levels would be "close to a nondetectable" level in
the case of the Landers Fork and only slightly above the
background level in the case of the Blackfoot. Despite the low
arsenic levels, state law normally would have required the
discharges to undergo a rigorous nondegradation review. In
1999, however, the legislature had amended the state water
quality laws to exempt certain "nonsignificant" activities,
including well tests.
The court addressed two interrelated issues: the plaintiffs'
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 1999
amendments, and the appropriate substantive standard of
review. Curiously, the court did not address another threshold
question that, over a quarter of a century after the 1972
Montana Constitution was passed, remained unanswered: were
the environmental provisions of the Montana Constitution selfexecuting? Instead, the court seemed to assume an affirmative
50
answer to the question.

48. The Supreme Court also has rediscovered the environmental provisions' value
in defending governmental actions. In State v. Boyer, 2002 MT 33, 308 Mont. 276, 42
P.3d 771, for example, the court used the environmental provisions to help defend and
uphold the government's search of the well of a fisherman's boat for illegal catch. In
light of the environmental provisions, the fisherman did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the well. The environmental provisions, as well as other state
laws and regulations, "mandate special considerations to assure that our wild places and
the creatures that inhabit them are preserved for future generations." Id. at %22.
49. 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236.
50. Professor John Horwich justifiably has criticized the Montana Supreme Court's
opinion in MEIC for this and other failings. See John L. Horwich, MEIC v. DEQ: An
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As to standing, the court rejected the defendants' argument
that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had failed to
show that the arsenic levels in the rivers were unsafe and thus
that they had suffered either an injury in fact or a violation of
their right to a "clean and healthful environment." According to
the court, the environmental provisions were meant to be "both
anticipatory and preventative." 51 The plaintiffs had met the
threshold test for a constitutional challenge and established
standing to raise that challenge by showing that the test waters
had concentrations of arsenic greater than background levels
and that normally the state would have required a
nondegradation review in such circumstances. The court in
essence concluded that the Montana Constitution embodied a
precautionary principle.5 2 "The delegates did not intend to
merely prohibit that degree of environmental degradation which
can be conclusively linked to ill health or physical
endangerment. Our constitution does not require that dead fish
float on the surface of our state's rivers and streams before its
53
farsighted environmental protections can be invoked."
According to the court, any degradation to the environment
implicates the rights ensured by Articles II and IX of the
Constitution and can trigger judicial review.
As to the appropriate standard of review, the court began by
deciding that the right to a "clean and healthful" environment is
a fundamental right. As a consequence, "any statute or rule
which implicates that right must be strictly scrutinized and can
only survive scrutiny if the State establishes a compelling state
interest and that its action is closely tailored to effectuate that
interest and is the least onerous path that can be taken to
achieve the State's objective."5 4 In dictum, the court also
announced that it would also apply strict scrutiny to (1) any
state action that implicates the "rights provided for in Article IX,
Section 1" (presumably including prevention of "unreasonable
Inadequate Effort to Address the Meaning of Montana's Constitutional Environmental
Provisions, 62 MONT. L. REV. 269 (2001).
51. MEIC, T 77.
52.
Increasingly accepted as a principle of international environmental law, the
precautionary principle provides that where "there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation." 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1, 31 I.L.M., Principle 15.
53. MEIC, 91
77.
54. Id. 1 63.
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depletion and degradation of natural resources" that do not
affect the "environmental life support system"), and (2) any
"private action" that implicates either Article II, Section 3 or
Article IX, Section 1. 55 Turning to the facts of the case, the court
concluded that the nondegradation review procedures of state
law were a "reasonable legislative implementation" of the
constitutional rights and that the legislature had "violated those
environmental rights" by "arbitrarily" excluding test wells and
other activities from the review "without regard to the nature or
volume of the substances being discharged." 56 Although this
could be read as the end of the matter, the court instead
remanded to the district court "for strict scrutiny of the
statutory provision in question, and in particular for a
determination of whether there is a compelling state interest for
the enactment of that statute based on the criteria we
articulated in State v. Wadsworth [sic]."87
Two years after MEIC, the Supreme Court reached out to
apply the environmental provisions to private actions. In CapeFrance Enterprises v. Estate of Peed,58 the owner of a tract of
land in Bozeman had entered into a contract to subdivide and
sell a portion of the land for a motel or hotel. When subdividing
the property proved difficult and financially risky, the owner
sought to rescind the agreement on grounds of mutual mistake,
impossibility, and impracticability of performance. One of the
obstacles to subdividing the property was the presence of an
underground pollution plume in the vicinity of the tract.
Because the subdivision would rely on groundwater, the
Department of Water Quality insisted that the property owner
drill a test well, but warned that if the well broadened the
pollution plume, the owner would be held liable for the resulting
cleanup costs. The district court concluded that this risk
absolved the owner of its contractual obligation.
Although the Supreme Court agreed with the district court
that the contract could be rescinded on common law grounds, it
went on to hold that the contract also was invalid under the
environmental provisions of the Montana Constitution. The
Supreme Court already had held in MEIC that the
constitutional provisions applied to private action and private
55. Id. T 64.
56. Id. 80.
57. Id.
81, (citing presumably to Wadsworth v. State, 275 Mont. 287, 911 P.2d
1165 (1996)).
58. 2001 MT 139, 305 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d 1011.
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parties. As a result, it would be "unlawful" for the property
owner "to drill a well on its property in the face of substantial
evidence that doing so may cause significant degradation of
59
uncontaminated aquifers and pose serious public health risks."
A court, moreover, could not order specific performance of the
contract without itself violating the environmental provisions of
the constitution.
The Supreme Court reemphasized that the environmental
"guarantee" in the Montana Constitution is a "fundamental
right that may be infringed only by demonstrating a compelling
state interest."60 The compelling state interest test, moreover,
requires exceptionally strong justification. According to the
court, a compelling state interest is "at a minimum, some
interest 'of the highest order and ... not otherwise served"' or
"the gravest abuse, endangering a paramount government
interest." 61 The law's interest in the enforcement of contracts
clearly was not the sort of compelling state interest that would
justify specific performance of the contract at issue in the case.
The court's efforts to apply the constitutional provisions to
private action have proven controversial. Three of the seven
justices in Cape France Enterprises would not have addressed
the constitutional issues, particularly given that the parties
neither raised nor briefed them. Justice Gray in particular
expressed concern that the court was addressing an issue "still
in its infancy" without adequate guidance or facts. "Montana
constitutional rights relating to the environment are hugely
important and impactful to the citizens of Montana and should
not be dallied with by this Court in the absence of issues being
62
raised in the District Court and fully briefed in this Court."
Neither MEIC nor Cape France attempted to set out in
detail how strict scrutiny will work in the environmental
context, and the future development of the constitutional
provisions will largely depend on how the Montana Supreme
Court works out those details.
Strict scrutiny remains a
relatively vague concept that has varied considerably from case
to case and from court to court. The Montana Supreme Court
has emphasized in other contexts that strict scrutiny of state
action is a "delicate matter" that eschews "mechanical
59.
60.
61.
989 P.2d
62.

Id. 1 33.
Id.
31.
Id., (quoting Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, n.6, 296 Mont. 361, 376 n.6,
364, 375 n.6.)
Id. 9 75 (Gray, J., dissenting).
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approaches. '63 The court therefore has not set out any specific
formula for determining "what makes a state interest
'compelling,"' but instead has left the issue for case-by-case
determinations. 64

II. IMPLEMENTING FUNDAMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
A. The State Role in U.S. Environmental Law
When the Montana electorate ratified the state Constitution
in June 1972, environmental law was in its infancy, and
Congress had only begun to federalize the field. Congress had
passed the National Environmental Policy Act, addressing the
environmental performance of federal agencies, and the Clean
65
Air Act, establishing tough new national air quality standards.
But the vast array of national environmental statutes that today
pervade the field were yet to come. In setting out environmental
rights and obligations, the drafters of the Montana Constitution
thus were writing on a virtually blank slate with little
experience in the complexities of environmental policy. They
also were devising constitutional rights and directives at a time
when states were still the major players in the environmental
field.
Since ratification of the Montana Constitution, Congress
has largely nationalized environmental law. In the 1970s and
early 1980s, Congress passed major laws addressing water
pollution, safe drinking water, solid waste disposal, toxic
substances, endangered species, and the cleanup of hazardous
waste. 66 National environmental laws today address to varying
degrees virtually every major environmental issue.
In
interpreting environmental provisions in state constitutions,
state courts must consider these national environmental laws,
much as they must consider the national Bill of Rights in
interpreting parallel state bills of rights. 67 Like the national Bill
63. Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 303, 911 P.2d at 1174, (quoting Robinson v. Cahill,
303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J. 1973)).
64. Armstrong, 1999 MT 261, n.6.
65. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 101-113 (3d ed. 2000) (providing a brief history of environmental law in the
United States).
66. See id. at 105-107 (setting out a chronology of major federal environmental
legislation).
67. For discussion of some of the issues raised by parallel federal and state bills of
rights, see Ronald K.L. Collins, The Once 'New Judicial Federalism"and Its Critics, 64
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of Rights, federal environmental laws provide a floor below
In a few instances, national
which states cannot drop.
environmental laws or other federal legal principals also may
prevent the imposition of higher standards.
National
environmental laws may preempt stricter state standards, 68 for
example, or the "dormant" commerce clause may prohibit state
69
regulation of issues that implicate interstate commerce.
State environmental provisions, nonetheless, remain
exceptionally important. Despite the federalization of U.S.
environmental law, states remain on the front line of a wide
number of important issues. 70 The national government has yet
to pass laws in some areas, abandoning effective regulation for
the moment to the states. Examples here range from global
climate change, where the national government has adopted an
approach consisting largely of research and voluntarism, and
the overdrafting of groundwater aquifers. 71 In other areas,
national environmental laws have purposefully addressed only
some aspects of a problem, carving other aspects out for state
regulation. The Clean Water Act, for example, does not directly
regulate
non-point
pollution from agriculture,
mines,
construction sites, and other diffuse sources, leaving regulatory
WASH. L. REV. 5 (1989) (discussing the debate over the proper role for state
interpretation of state bills of rights); Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State
Constitutions - The Montana Disaster, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1095 (1985) (criticizing the
Montana Supreme Court's position that the Montana right against self-incrimination
affords no greater protection than the equivalent federal right).
68. In most cases, Congress has explicitly preserved the right of states to set
higher environmental standards. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370
(2002). Some federal statutes, however, do preempt both weaker and stricter standards.
The Clean Air Act, for example, strictly limits the ability of states to set automobile
emission standards that are stricter than those set by the national government. Clean
Air Act § 209, 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2002). The Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide, and
Pesticide Act restricts the ability of states to pass stricter pesticide regulations. Federal
Insecticide, Rodenticide, and Pesticide Act § 24, 7 U.S.C. § 136v (2002).
69. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (states cannot
prohibit disposal of out-of-state waste).
70. For a valuable discussion of the role of states today in the environmental field,
see Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001).
71. Some states have responded to the vacuum. In the face of Congressional
failure to reduce the United States' emissions of global greenhouse gases, for example,
environmental groups in California recently pushed legislation through the California
legislature mandating that the California Air Resources Control Board develop
regulations to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide from California vehicles. See Danny
Hakim, Detroit and CaliforniaRev Their Engines Over Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2002, at 4. A number of states have taken steps to regulate groundwater mining. See
William Blomquist, Exploring State Differences in Groundwater Policy Adoptions, 19801989, PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM, Spring 1991, at 101.
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choices over non-point pollution largely to the states. 72 The
Endangered Species Act focuses most of its attention on species
at the brink of extinction, leaving more general biodiversity
management largely to the states. 73 Even where the national
government has chosen to regulate an environmental problem,
state governments have dhosen to adopt additional or stricter
environmental policies in fields as diverse as air pollution and
hazardous waste cleanups. 74 Most national environmental laws,
moreover, adopt a policy of "cooperative federalism" under which
the national government sets overall environmental policy but
delegates authority over implementation and many of the
regulatory details to states. 75 In summary, although the
environmental field has changed dramatically since the 1972
Montana Constitution, state constitutional provisions are still of
great importance.
B. The PotentialPromise
The Montana Supreme Court's decisions in MEIC and Cape
France Enterprises are stunningly breathtaking in both their
potential reach and their potential to change the face of
environmental law. Environmental interests will be tempted to
use the newly invigorated environmental provisions of the
Montana Constitution in at least three significant ways. First,
environmental interests will want to tighten and expand
Montana's environmental laws, either through judicial
challenges to legislative actions and inactions or through direct
constitutional entreaties
to the legislature.
Second,
environmental interests will wish to strengthen judicial review
of administrative actions implicating the environment. Finally,
environmental interests will desire to broaden the opportunity
for private individuals and groups to bring lawsuits challenging
both public and private actions that threaten environmental
harm. If environmentalists succeed in large part in achieving
72.

See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 897-900 (3d

ed. 2000) (noting that the Clean Water Act leaves the regulation of non-point pollution
primarily up to states and local governments).
73. See Jon Weiner, Natural Communities Conservation Planning:An Ecosystem
Approach to Protecting Endangered Species, 47 STAN. L. REV. 319 (1995) (commending
California's Natural Communities Conservation Planning approach as an alternative to
the "emergency room" approach of the Endangered Species Act).
74. Revesz, supra note 70, at 578-626.
75. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1148-78 (1995) (discussing Congress'
adoption of various cooperative federalism approaches).
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these goals, MEIC and Cape France Enterprises will have
revolutionized environmental policy in Montana.
1. Strengtheningenvironmental laws.
Despite the advances in environmental law over the past
thirty years, environmental interests remain dissatisfied with
state and national policy on a number of fronts. In some areas
such as global greenhouse gas emissions, neither the national
nor state governments have taken any effective regulatory
action. In other areas such as water contamination, national
and state laws carve out various exceptions that can undermine
ultimate environmental goals. In yet other areas such as air
quality, national and state laws are relatively comprehensive,
but environmental interests are dissatisfied with the chosen
level of protection.
In many cases, environmental dissatisfaction can be chalked
up to policy disagreements.
Environmentalists often see
environmental issues in moral terms with little, if any, room for
economic considerations.
From the environmentalist's
perspective, no level of pollution or harm to natural resources
may be acceptable, no matter how costly it might be to society to
eliminate the problem. Legislatures and the median voter, by
contrast, sometimes take a more utilitarian approach to
environmental issues and consciously trade off environmental
harm for economic gain.
In other cases, however, legislative pathologies may make it
difficult to enact environmental laws even where the measures
are widely supported by the population. Political economists
have long worried that industries, which readily can mount
concerted and intensive lobbying efforts when faced by costly
regulatory measures, may have a political advantage over the
more diffuse environmental interests of the general public.
Environmental groups, in fact, do appear to have difficulty
mustering significant political leverage in state legislatures. In
one of the most exhaustive studies of state environmental policy,
Professor Evan Ringquist found that "environmental group
strength" (as measured by the number of national
environmental group members per 1,000 residents of a state)
correlated only weakly with the strength of environmental
laws. 76
76.
EVAN J. RINGQUIST, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AT THE STATE LEVEL:
POLITICS AND PROGRESS IN CONTROLLING POLLUTION 119-20 (1993).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/7

20

2003

CONSTITUTIONALIZING
THEthe
ENVIRONMENT
Thompson: Constitutionalizing
Environment

177

Empirical studies, however, have not shown that industries
in general have a disproportionate effect on environmental
policy. The Ringquist study, for example, concluded that
manufacturing industries in the 1980s did not enjoy excessive
sway over state environmental legislation. Thus "polluting
industry strength" (as measured in each state by the value
added by manufacturing in the most polluting industries as a
percentage of the gross state product) did not contribute to lower
environmental standards. Indeed, polluting industry strength
was correlated with stronger air pollution laws, perhaps because
the greater pollution threat increased the perceived need for
stronger laws. 77 The same study, however, concluded that
extractive industries were an exception to the general rule.
"Mining strength" (as measured by the value of mining output
as a percentage of gross state product), for example, was
correlated with weaker water quality regulations. 78 Other, more
anecdotal studies suggest that agriculture also enjoys
disproportionate political power over environmental legislation
79
at both the national and state levels.
As a consequence, the agricultural and extractive industries
often enjoy lenient regulatory treatment when compared with
other industries with equivalent impacts on the environment.
Nonpoint water pollution is a good illustration. Although the
federal Clean Water Act and most state laws tightly limit
effluent discharges from sewage facilities and other point
sources, agricultural return flow, minirig runoff, and other
nonpoint sources of pollution generally are subject to relatively
vague and loose management standards at best.8 0 Montana
enjoys relatively high quality water, yet as of 2002, Montana
reported that less than five percent of the waterways that it
surveyed fully supported their designated beneficial uses;
almost fifty percent of the stream miles and over eighty percent
of the lake and wetland area were impaired, with the remainder
needing reassessment. 8 ' Of the lakes, reservoirs, and wetlands
designated for drinking water use, over half (by acreage) did not

77. Id. at 116-20.
78. Id. at 161-65.
79. For an excellent survey of the advantages enjoyed by agriculture under
national environmental laws, see J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000).
80. Id. at 287-92.
81.
2002
Montana
305(b)
Report,
at
9,
available
at
http://nris.state.mt.us/wis/TMDLApp/pdf2002/305text.pdf (visited Feb. 5, 2003).
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support the designated use; almost 20 percent of the stream
miles designated for drinking water use did not support the
use.8 2 Nonpoint pollution was the main culprit. Agricultural
runoff was a contamination source for approximately two thirds
of the impaired stream mileage and 80 percent of the impaired
lake acreage; mining was a source for over a quarter of the
impaired stream mileage and almost 60 percent of the impaired
lake acreage.8 3 No other source approached these levels of
significance.
Groundwater contamination from agriculture
84
similarly remains a problem in much of the nation.
Water pollution is not the only area in which agriculture
gets a break. Both federal and state governments, for example,
generally regulate pesticide applications far less rigorously than
they do other forms of hazardous exposures.8 5 Cost is an open
and direct consideration in the regulation of pesticides under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),
but not in the regulation of hazardous substances under the
Clean Air Act or the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
As a result, farm workers consistently come into contact with
pesticides that, as waste, are subject to strict disposal
regulations. FIFRA also is the only major federal environmental
statute that does not permit citizens to bring enforcement
actions when the government has failed to act.
Yet another example of the power of the agricultural lobby
at the national level is wetlands regulation. The majority of
wetlands remaining in the United States are in agricultural
regions.8 6 While section 404 of the federal Clean Water Act
requires landowners to obtain permits from the Army Corps of
Engineers before filling a wetland, section 404(f) exempts a
number of activities from permitting requirements, including

82. Id. at 10.
83. Id. at 13.
84. See David E. Adelman & John H. Barton, Environmental Regulation for
Agriculture: Towards a Framework to Promote Sustainable Intensive Agriculture, 21
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 16 (2002) (noting that agricultural use of fertilizers and pesticides
is one of the leading causes of groundwater contamination in the United States).
85. See, e.g., Kristen C. Chapin, Pest Eradication Programs and Fundamental
Rights: Evolving Constitutional Concerns and the Case for Strict Scrutiny Judicial
Review, 22 ENVTL. L. 1067 (1992); Victor M. Sher, Pests, Poisons, and Power:
ConstitutionalImplications of State Pest EradicationProjects in California, 1 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 89 (1986).

86. Jeffrey A. Zinn, Soil and Water Conservation Issues (Cong. Res. Service Issue
Brief No. 96030, Jan. 22, 2001), available at http://www.cnie.orgnle/ag-18.cfm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2003).
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"normal farming, silviculture, and ranching activities."8 7 Only
some property owners interested in using their wetlands in a
manner that subjects them to section 404, moreover, must apply
for individual permits. The remaining property owners proceed
under nationwide general permits that do not require case-by88
case environmental review by the Army Corps of Engineers.
In 1994, almost 90 percent of non-exempt agricultural activities
were approved under nationwide general permits.8 9
Various forms of cognitive error also may hinder the
enactment of environmental laws. People, for example, appear
to find it difficult to make the economic sacrifices needed to
eliminate longterm environmental problems, such as global
climate change or pesticide toxicity, that are clouded by
scientific uncertainty. In these settings, people tend to engage
in wishful thinking and assume that the problem is less serious
than scientific studies would suggest. 90 They tend to buy into
the more optimistic studies and projections. People also heavily
discount the future benefits of current sacrifice, in part because
the sacrifice is immediate and thus more salient. 9 1 For these
and other reasons, people may well oppose steps that would
appear to be in their personal interest and often will simply
avoid confronting an environmental issue until serious harm has
occurred.
Whatever the source of discontent, the Montana
constitutional provisions provide environmental groups with a
means to try to strengthen state law through the courts. MEIC
is likely to be only the first and perhaps easiest in a series of
cases challenging legislative action and inaction in the
environmental field. As discussed further in the next section,
MEIC presented the courts with a relatively simple and
standard
legal issue: was
the challenged
exclusion
constitutional? The Montana Supreme Court did not have to
develop a new environmental standard or, even worse, an
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (2002).
88. Ralph E. Heimlich et al., Wetlands and Agriculture: PrivateInterest and Public
Benefits 104 (U.S. Dept. of Agric., Agric. Econ. Report No. 765, Sept. 1998), availableat
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer765/aer765.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
During the Clinton Administration, however, efforts were made to tighten the
requirements for nationwide permits. Id. at 38.
89. Id. at 27
90. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing
the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 258-59 (2000) (elaborating on the problem in the
context of commons dilemmas).
91. Id. at 262-263.
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entirely new environmental program. If the exception was
unconstitutional, the basic nondegradation standard would take
over.
Future lawsuits, however, may prove more challenging by
requiring courts to become more actively involved in
environmental policymaking and regulation. An environmental
group, for example, might challenge the current state air quality
standard for particulates as "unhealthful" - forcing the courts to
determine whether the particular standard is too low and also
perhaps, if the standard is too low, what is the appropriate
standard. 92 Yet another environmental group might challenge
the state's failure to reduce emissions of various greenhouse
gases, on the theory that the failure of the state to act threatens
the climate and thus both the "environmental life support
system" and a "healthful environment." 93 In cases where the
environmental plaintiff challenges legislative inaction rather
than action, the courts might find themselves faced with the
daunting task of designing and implementing a regulatory
system from scratch.
Some plaintiffs also will push for more intrusive remedies.
In most cases, environmental plaintiffs are likely to seek
equitable relief that either declares particular legislation to be
unconstitutional or orders particular state action. In Orr v.
State of Montana,94 however, a number of asbestos victims are
seeking damages from the state for failing to regulate asbestos.
Plaintiffs claim that, by not ensuring them a "clean and
healthful
environment," the state has
committed
a
constitutional tort entitling them to damages. Although the
district court has concluded that damages cannot be awarded,
the claim presents a difficult issue. Courts have recognized
constitutional torts in other contexts, and many constitutional
scholars have argued in favor of a greater use of damages in the

92. Under Mont. Code § 75-2-207, the Montana Board of Environmental Review
must adopt the federal ambient air quality standard unless it finds that a higher
standard is needed to protect public health and is "achievable with current technology."
One constitutional issue is whether the public has a right to a clean and healthful
environment only where it is technologically feasible for industry to reduce their
emissions without closing down.
93. As discussed in note 71, California now has taken an initial step to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles. An environmental group readily could
argue that the Montana constitutional provisions demand no less of the Montana
legislature.
94. No. BDV-201-423 (1st Judicial Dist. Ct., Aug. 16, 2002) (order dismissing
plaintiffs' claims).
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constitutional setting. 95 In Dorwart v. Caraway,96 the Montana
Supreme Court itself recently found that there is a private right
of damages for violations of the state constitutional rights to due
process, privacy, and freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures. In dictum, moreover, the court suggested that there is
a private cause of action for monetary damages for all "selfexecuting" provisions of the Montana Constitution. 97 Justice
Nelson, in concurrence, went further. Noting that the Montana
Constitution provides for various affirmative rights including
that to a clean and healthful environment, Nelson concluded
that Article II, Section 34 of the Montana Constitution provides
for a "direct action for damages" for violations of the
"fundamental rights protected under Montana's Constitution."9 8
Recognition of a damage action for violations of
constitutional rights to a healthful environment, however, would
be unprecedented, provide a new incentive to sue, and raise
critical questions. No state courts has ever read a damage
remedy into a state constitution's environmental provisions, and
the drafters of the Montana Constitution expressly declined to
create a cause of action for violation of the environmental
provisions. 99 Where courts have recognized damage actions in
other context, moreover, employees of the government have
affirmatively invaded constitutional rights. An action against
the state itself for failing to provide an affirmative right raises
significantly different issues.
Given the vast array of
environmental harms, and the lengthy period during which the
Montana Supreme Court did not actively wield the
constitutional provisions, recognition of a damage action could
open the state up to sizable claims for past injuries. As the
district court noted in its decision in Orr, a damage cause of
action "would make the State potentially liable for failure to
prevent every environmentally related problem suffered by
anyone in Montana," including perhaps lung cancer from

95. For recent discussions of the issue, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy
Gap in ConstitutionalLaw, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999). The vast majority of states that
have considered the issue, as well as federal courts, have recognized private causes of
action for at least some constitutional violations. See Gail Donoghue & Jonathan I.
Edelstein, Life After Brown: The Future of State ConstitutionalTort Actions in New York,
42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 447, n.2 (1998).
96. 2002 MT 240, 312 Mont. 1, 58 P.2d 128.
97. Id. 44.
98. Id.
110 (Nelson, J., specially concurring).
99. 5 MONT. CONST. CONV. TR. 1228, 1241, 1246, 1254 (1972).
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second-hand smoke. 0 0
Lawsuits, of course, are inherently costly, time consuming,
and risky. As a result, environmental groups will typically turn
to the courts only as a last resort. Before suing, environmental
groups are likely instead to use cases like MEIC to urge the
legislature itself to eliminate exceptions, adopt stronger
standards, and enact new regulatory programs. Cases like
MEIC provide environmental organizations with greater
leverage in their lobbying. Environmental groups can argue
that the legislature has a constitutional obligation to strengthen
environmental law, can claim the constitutional mantle in public
debate, and can threaten to sue if forced to do so. Supportive
legislators also can use the constitutional provisions to try to
sway wavering representatives in debate. During the 2001
debate over amendments to the Montana Environmental Policy
Act, State Senator Mike Halligan made exactly this type of
argument in favor of an amendment that would have given
agencies greater discretion to condition permits in order to
Many
protect a "clean and healthful environment. " 1 1
legislators, of course, may ignore these entreaties, particularly if
the State Supreme Court does not continue to employ the
constitutional provisions actively. In the end, environmental
groups are likely to find it necessary to bring lawsuits both to
challenge what the legislature does or does not do and to
strengthen their leverage in political negotiations. Plaintiffs,
however, are likely to temper their claims since the loss of a
lawsuit could undermine that leverage.
2. Strengtheningjudicial review.
Although environmental groups frequently challenge
administrative actions, they are at a distinct legal disadvantage
in most cases. Burden and standard of proof are immensely
important in environmental cases. Environmental issues are

100.
"For example, the suggestion put forth by Plaintiffs would make the State
liable in tort for every case of lung cancer that could have been caused by second hand
smoke. Plaintiffs in those cases could argue that it was the duty of the State to maintain
a clean and healthy environment which it failed to do by allowing other people to
smoke." No. BDV-201-423 (1st Judicial Dist. Ct., Aug. 16, 2002) (order dismissing
plaintiffs' claims).
101. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., Legislature Cripples the Montana Environmental Policy
Act, http://www.meic.org/200lLegislature/2001MEPA.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
Senator Fred Thomas, however, responded that the Supreme Court, not state agencies,
should be determining what is required under the Montana Constitution. Id.
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frequently clouded by uncertainty. Scientists often are not sure
of the likely impacts of particular activities or substances.
Estimates of the costs or feasibility of regulation also are often
highly uncertain. Given the high level of uncertainty, it often is
extremely difficult to prove that an agency determination is
incorrect.
At both the national and state level, however, plaintiffs
generally have the burden of proving that an agency erred or
acted illegally. 10 2 In reviewing agency actions, moreover, both
national and state courts strongly defer to agency factual
determinations. Under the national Administrative Procedure
Act, for example, courts can overturn agency rulemaking
determinations only if they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
10 3
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
Although the standard is not toothless, it tilts the balance
heavily in favor of the agency on factual issues. Montana law is
similar. A court may reverse an agency's factual judgment only
if the judgment is "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record."10 4 A
"reviewing court must affirm the findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. If the findings of fact are supported by reliable and
substantial evidence, the reviewing court may not reweigh the
05
evidence."'1
The strict scrutiny approach adopted by the Montana
Supreme Court in MEIC and Cape France could transform
judicial review in the environmental field. As noted in Part I,
the Montana Supreme Court has not specified in any detail how
strict scrutiny will work in environmental cases.
MEIC,
however, suggests that a plaintiff need only show that a state
action may undermine the constitutional guarantees in order to
invoke strict scrutiny. 0 6 Once strict scrutiny is triggered, the

102. See, e.g., Trustees v. Anderson, 232 Mont. 501, 503, 757 P.2d 1315, 1317 (1988)
([A] rebuttable presumption exists in favor of the agency's decision and... the burden
of proof is on the party attacking it to show that it is erroneous.").
103.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A) (2002). In the case of adjudicatory proceedings, courts can
invalidate decisions that are "unsupported by substantial evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)
(2002).
104. Mont. Code Ann. § 2-4-704(2)(a)(v) (2001). See State Pers. Div. v. Child
Support Investigators, 2002 MT 46,
18, 289 Mont. 407,
18, 43 P.3d 305,
18
(applying Mont. Code Ann. § 2-4-704(2)(a)(v)); Ulrich v. State, 1998 MT 196,
13, 289
Mont. 407, 1 13, 961 P.2d 126, 9113.
105. Anderson, 232 Mont. at 503, 757 P.2d at 1317.
106. The constitutional provisions thus do not require that a plaintiff "conclusively
link" an action to "ill health or physical endangerment." MEIC, 1 77.
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government has the burden of proving that a compelling state
interest justifies the action. The Constitution demands that the
court decide for itself, based on the evidence presented to it,
whether a compelling state interest exists. "Simply because the
State alleges a compelling interest, does not obviate the
necessity that the State prove the compelling interest by
competent evidence."107 Turning to the compelling state interest
standard itself, the state action must be "carefully tailored" to
1 08
achieve that interest and not any ulterior purposes.
Moreover, there must not be any other means of achieving the
compelling state interest that poses less of a threat to the
environmental guarantee. The challenged action must be the
"least onerous path that can be taken to achieve the state
objective." 109
To see the potential ramifications of the strict scrutiny
standard, imagine that an environmental group pushes in
Montana for a higher ambient air quality standard for sulfur
dioxide.
The Montana Board of Environmental Review
considers raising the standard, but ultimately decides that a
higher standard is neither justified nor feasible. Scientists are
split on the health risk posed by the current standard, and
companies claim that they would have to close down if the
standard were adopted. The environmental group sues. Under
traditional judicial review, the environmental group probably
would lose.
The board has reached a reasonable factual
determination under the applicable state statute. Under strict
scrutiny, however, the board arguably would have the burden to
show that company closures are a compelling state interest and
that they justify the board's decision.
3. Creating new private causes of action.
One of the most important innovations in the modern
environmental era has been the involvement of citizens and
environmental groups in the enforcement of environmental
laws. 110 All but one of the major national environmental laws
passed since 1970 has included a citizen suit provision."' Under
107. Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 302, 911 P.2d at 1174.
108. Id.; State v. Pastos, 269 Mont. 43, 47, 887 P.2d 199, 202 (1994).
109. Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 302, 911 P.2d at 1174; Pfost v. State, 219 Mont. 206,
222, 713 P.2d 495, 505 (1985).
110. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen
Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185 (2000).
111. As mentioned earlier, the anomalous exception is the Federal Insecticide,
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the typical citizen suit section, any individual or organization
with constitutional standing can initiate a lawsuit against
anyone alleged to be in violation of one or more specified
provisions of the statute. All citizen suit provisions authorize
injunctive relief. A growing number of citizen suit provisions
also authorize
courts to impose monetary penalties.
Environmental organizations have used citizen suits to ensure
effective enforcement of the environmental laws, shape
interpretation of the laws, and steer governmental policy. 112
Outside the context of citizen suits, however, environmental
organizations and individual citizens often have only a limited
ability to file judicial actions to protect the environment. Most
states, including Montana, do not provide citizens or
organizations with a right to pursue violations of the state
environmental laws. In most states, moreover, environmental
groups and individual citizens do not have standing to bring
public nuisance actions against environmentally harmful
activities unless they can show that they have suffered a
"special" injury different from that sustained by the general
public. 113 Only property owners can file actions in private
nuisance. 114 Furthermore, although courts have used both
private and public nuisance to eliminate and regulate
environmental harms, the substantive standards are weaker
than many of the health-based standards found in many of the
major environmental statutes. Nuisance standards emphasize
115
balancing and "reasonableness" and eschew "extreme rights."
MEIC and Cape France again offer environmentalists the
hope of eliminating (or, perhaps more accurately, bypassing)
these traditional limits. Under a broad reading of the Montana
Supreme Court's decisions, environmental organizations and
individual citizens have the standing to file actions seeking to
enjoin any public or private action that threatens environmental
harm. The Montana Supreme Court previously had held that
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. Supra text accompanying note 85.
112. For a detailed discussion of the provisions and uses of citizen suit provisions,
see Thompson, supra note 110.
113. For a discussion of the traditional standing rules and efforts in a handful of
states to broaden standing, see Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance:
Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755 (2001). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 cmt. c (1979).

114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 cmt. d (1979).
115. See Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (warning that parties cannot
expect to 'stand on extreme rights"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 cmt. c
(1979) (describing "reasonableness" standard).
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standing to assert constitutional rights requires an alleged
injury that is "distinguishable from the injury to the
complaining party," although the injury does not need to be
"exclusive to the complaining party."'1 6 Relying on several
recent cases, however, the Montana Supreme Court in MEIC
emphasized that a citizen who is directly affected by pollution or
other environmental harms generally will satisfy this
standard. "1 7 If the plaintiffs can establish an interference with
their environmental rights under the Montana Constitution,
moreover, courts arguably must enjoin the challenged activity
unless they can find a compelling state interest for the
interference.
As the court stressed in Cape France, the
environmental rights are "fundamental" and "may be infringed
only by demonstrating a compelling state interest."" l8 MEIC
and Cape France thus provide for much stronger standards than
the type of balancing test traditional to nuisance actions.
Under this reading, MEIC and Cape France radically
expand the opportunity for private citizens and environmental
organizations to help shape environmental policy through the
courts. Where the legislature has enacted a regulatory scheme
but it is not being effectively enforced, environmental groups
and citizens may be able to sue the violators directly in the
courts on the ground that the defendants are violating their
constitutional rights, as defined by the legislative provisions
that are being violated. Where the legislature has failed to act,
or environmentalists are dissatisfied with the level of protection,
moreover, environmentalists may be able to proceed directly
against a source of environmental harm on constitutional
grounds rather than seeking to force the legislature to address
the issue. Under this reading of MEIC and Cape France, the
Montana Constitution could become a combination of (1) a
comprehensive citizen suit provision and (2) a roving
environmental common law in which the courts, at the request

116. Helena Parents Comm'n v. Lewis & Clark Cty., 277 Mont. 367, 370, 922 P.2d
1140, 1142 (1996).
117. MEIC,
43-45. Thus, in Missoula City-County Air Pollution Control Board v.
Board. of Environmental Review, 282 Mont. 255, 937 P.2d 463 (1997), a resident of
Missoula had standing to complain of local air pollution because he was "more
particularly affected by the State Board's acts than is a citizen of another area." 282
Mont. at 267, 937 P.2d at 467-68. In MEIC, the plaintiffs had standing because the
challenged conduct would have "an arguably adverse impact on the area in the
headwaters of the Blackfoot River in which they fish and otherwise recreate, and which
is a source for the water which many of them consume." MEIC, 45.
118. Cape France, 31.
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of environmental groups and citizens, directly evaluate and
regulate challenged activities.
C. The PotentialProblems
For all of these reasons, environmentalists certainly will
encourage the Montana Supreme Court to expand on MEIC and
Cape France in future cases. But efforts to "constitutionalize"
environmental protection raise a number of jurisprudential or
policy issues with which the court will need to wrestle. The
major concerns are three. First, what do the constitutional
provisions protect and, more importantly, to what degree? How
far society should go to protect the environment is a highly
contentious political question on which there currently is no
clear societal consensus. Second, how can courts implement and
enforce the constitutional provisions? Although implementation
and enforcement might be relatively easy where the state
legislature already has created a regulatory regime, many cases
may seek judicial protection against currently unregulated
activities. Even where a regulatory regime currently exists,
courts must worry about how to ensure that the administrative
agency implements and enforces the court's order even in the
face of budgetary restraints and political hostility. Finally, how
will the court's decisions affect the legislative process? Although
strong judicial opinions might encourage the legislature to take
more action itself to protect the environment, judicial
intervention also could reduce the chances of legislative action.
1. Designingenvironmental standards.
The environmental provisions in the Montana Constitution
suggest that there are certain basic, absolute levels of
environmental protection that society can readily achieve. The
Constitution thus guarantees a "clean and healthful
environment" and demands protection of the "environmental life
support system."
A combination of political idealism and
scientific naivety in the early 1970s helped foster this
perspective. Many people saw environmental issues in moral
terms: environmental degradation that harmed humans or the
environment was morally wrong and unacceptable. Society
should and could outlaw it much like it had outlawed
discrimination. Many people, moreover, assumed that there
were certain minimum levels of pollution, land use, and resource
development that were harmless and that society could achieve
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2003
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these levels with an acceptable investment of resources.
Over the past thirty years, however, policymakers have
learned that environmental regulation frequently involves
Virtually all forms of economic activity
difficult tradeoffs.
produce some environmental harm, and thus the question is
often how much society should give up in order to achieve
varying levels of environmental health. Reflecting the idealism
and naivety of the early 1970s, many of the earliest federal
statutes talk in environmental absolutes, but the federal
government has never demanded the levels of economic cost
needed to achieve those absolutes. The Clean Air Act states that
ambient air quality standards protect human health with an
adequate margin of safety, 119 but EPA always has made
tradeoffs in setting the standards, as it compares the additional
protection versus additional costs of ever more stringent
standards. 120 The Clean Water Act promised that all waterways
would be "fishable" and "swimmable" by 1983 and that the
nation would eliminate all water pollution by 1985,121 but almost
two decades after these deadlines only 16 percent of the nation's
watersheds enjoyed "good" water quality. 122 In other statutes
such as the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Toxic Substances
Control Act, Congress explicitly called23 for balancing
environmental benefits and regulatory costs.1
Whether explicitly or implicitly, environmental law must
grapple with the question of how much various types and levels
of environmental protection are worth. Some environmental
harms can be completely eliminated or avoided at finite and
socially acceptable costs. In many other cases, however, the
question is how much reduction or remediation is affordable.
Consider the decision, for example, of how much forest to
preserve in order to protect an endangered species from
extinction. A 1994 study of the northern spotted owl revealed

119. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2002).
120. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?,98 MICH. L. REV.
303 (1999).
121. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), (2) (2002).
122. See SAX ET AL., supra note 72, at 878 (1997 EPA Index classified 16% of
watersheds as enjoying good water quality, 36% as suffering moderate water quality
problems, and another 21% as suffering serious problems).
123. See Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(B) (2002) (providing for
the consideration of feasibility in setting of maximum contaminant levels for drinking
water); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) (2002) (requiring EPA to
consider the economic consequences of regulation in determining the reasonableness of
risks).
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that the marginal economic cost of achieving ever higher
probabilities of owl survival by preserving forest acreage grew
extremely large. 124 Increasing the probability of survival from
90 to 91 percent carried a marginal price tag of $1.4 billion.
Improving the survival probability even further to 95 percent
cost another $13 billion (or an average of $2.6 billion per
percentage point). At even this cost, however, there remained a
significant (five percent) chance that the spotted owl would
become extinct. Although it is simple in the abstract to say that
society must do everything possible to preserve endangered
species, few people would probably say that it is worth $13
billion to reduce the probability of extinction for the spotted owl
from 9 percent to 5 percent. Environmental law unfortunately
must inevitably grapple with tradeoffs of this nature.
Most courts have felt uncomfortable resolving these
tradeoffs in a constitutional setting. 125
Although courts
historically have weighed costs and benefits in nuisance cases,
constitutional cases threaten to make the courts into the
ultimate societal arbiter of environmental tradeoffs.
Few
societal norms or standards, however, are available to guide a
resolution. Legislatures have taken widely differing approaches
to environmental tradeoffs. Some statutes, for example, demand
environmental protection up to the limits of technological
feasibility; others worry about general economic feasibility, but
do not care if costs are high so long as companies do not go out of
126
business; yet others call for a broad cost-benefit comparison.
Absent an existing or emerging societal norm, courts have felt
rudderless trying to decide how much of society's resources to
devote to increasing the chances that an endangered species will
recover or to decreasing the chances of asthmatic attacks.
Comparing the costs and benefits of particular actions,
moreover, requires some metric for comparison, but the costs
and
benefits
in
environmental
disputes
are
often
1 27
incommensurate.
Under these circumstances, many courts
124. See Claire A. Montgomery, Gardner M. Brown, Jr., & Darius M. Adams, The
Marginal Cost of Species Preservation:The Northern Spotted Owl, 26 ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 111 (1994) (examining the costs and benefits of increased habitat protection).
125. Thompson, supra note 2, at 897.
126. Compare Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2002) (technological
feasibility), with Occupational Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 665(b)(5) (2002)
(economic feasibility) and Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c) (2002) (costbenefit comparison).
127. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 779, 794 n.48 (1994).
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have viewed environmental tradeoffs as quintessentially
political questions.
The Montana Supreme Court has not yet had to confront
MEIC considered an exemption to a
these problems.
The only
legislatively designed anti-degradation policy.
question facing the court was whether the exempt activities
were sufficiently different from other regulated activities to pass
strict scrutiny. The court simply assumed that the legislatively
adopted anti-degradation standard was adequate under the
Montana Constitution and therefore did not have to address the
appropriate standard of protection overall for the state's
waterways. In Cape France, no one argued that the value of the
test well was worth the environmental risk. The plaintiff did
not want to take the risk of drilling the well and sought the
courts' protection under contract law. The Montana Supreme
Court therefore again did not have to consider under what, if
any, circumstances parties should be entitled to drill
groundwater wells if the wells risk the spreading of a
contamination plume.
Perhaps because neither MEIC nor Cape France required
the Montana Supreme Court to confront the difficult tradeoffs
often found in environmental law, the court concluded without
any apparent controversy or concern that the environmental
provisions of the Montana Constitution trigger strict scrutiny
and a compelling state interest test. The legal case for strict
scrutiny is decidedly strong. The Montana Constitution places a
"clean and healthful" environment at the top of its list of
During the constitutional convention, a
inalienable rights.
majority of the delegates also emphasized that they wished to
enshrine the strongest possible environmental protections
(although the intent of the delegates, of course, is not necessarily
the same as the intent of the voters who ratified the
Constitution). The right to a "healthful environment," moreover,
seems as fundamental as (and, in a few cases, considerably more
important than) many of the interests that the United States
Supreme Court has identified as fundamental including
interstate travel 128 and the right of parents to direct the
129
upbringing and education of their children.
128. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (explaining that residency
standards for welfare payments are subject to strict scrutiny because of potential impact
on interstate travel).
129. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating Oregon law
requiring all children to attend public school).
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In future cases, however, the Montana Supreme Court will
need to mesh strict scrutiny analysis with the economic tradeoffs
common in the environmental field.
Unfortunately, strict
scrutiny, at least as developed in other substantive settings,
may not provide courts with the degree of flexibility needed for
such tradeoffs. The court's application of constitutional strict
scrutiny to environmental policy is unprecedented. In other
constitutional settings, however, the Montana Supreme Court
has emphasized that, under the compelling state interest
standard, a defendant "must show, at a minimum, some interest
'of the highest order and.., not otherwise served,' or 'the
gravest abuse[ ], endangering [a] paramount [government]
interest[ ].,,130 In the few cases to discuss the issue of cost
outside Montana, courts have held that cost generally is not a
compelling state interest. 1 1 Strict scrutiny by nature is not a
balancing approach and, in the typical case, provides for almost
132
automatic invalidation of challenged actions.
The realities of environmental law, however, are likely to
push the Montana Supreme Court in future cases toward a more
flexible approach that admits of environmental tradeoffs. The
court could obtain that increased flexibility in several ways.
First, it could either abandon strict scrutiny or, perhaps more
likely, redefine it to permit more open tradeoff of costs. In other
constitutional settings, the Montana Supreme Court has
emphasized that there is no specific formula for determining
"what makes a state interest 'compelling"' 33 and that judicial
review is a "delicate matter" that eschews "mechanical
approaches." 134 Strict scrutiny in the environmental context
therefore need not be the same as strict scrutiny in racial
discrimination cases or other settings. Strict scrutiny could
require courts to take a hard look at legislative policy judgments
and even to err in favor of environmental protection, without
forswearing all consideration of costs.
130. Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, 41 n.6, 269 Mont. 361, 41 n.6, 989 P.2d
364,
41 n.6, (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) and Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
131. See, e.g., Cooper v. Utah, 684 F. Supp. 1060, 1070 (D. Utah 1987) ("[A] state's
interest in saving welfare costs is not a compelling state interest.").
132. See Keith J. Bybee, The PoliticalSignificance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of
Affirmative Action, 34 LAw & Soc'y REV. 263, 269 (2000) (noting that strict scrutiny
typically results in the automatic invalidation of racial discrimination).
133. Armstsrong, 41.
134. Wadsworth, 257 Mont. at 302, 911 P.2d at 1174, (quoting Robinson v. Cahill,
303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J. 1973)).
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In deciding how to apply strict scrutiny, the court also might
decide to vary the standard depending on the constitutional
protection that is threatened. In MEIC, the Montana Supreme
Court indicated in dictum it would apply strict scrutiny to all
violations of either Article II, Section 3 or Article IX, Section
1.135 But some violations, such as a threat to human health or
the "environmental life support system," would seem
substantively
more
significant than
others, such as
unreasonable degradation of natural resources. The Montana
Constitution itself, moreover, creates an implicit hierarchy by
including only a "clean and healthful environment" in its list of
inalienable rights. The court therefore might decide to guard
some protections through a strong version of strict scrutiny
while securing others through a more lenient standard.
Second, the court might find balancing required by other
provisions of the Montana Constitution. The list of inalienable
rights in Article II of the 1972 Constitution does not stop with a
"clean and healthful environment" but also goes on to include
the "rights of pursuing life's basic necessities [and] acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property." The Montana Supreme
Court, moreover, has held that the opportunity to pursue
employment is essential to "pursuing life's basic necessities" and
thus a fundamental right itself, preventing the State from firing
a state employee for the mere appearance of a conflict of
interest.136 Where elimination of a pollutant or protection of a
resource would require the shuttering of an industrial plant or
the closing of a refinery, the Montana Constitution therefore
presents an apparent conflict between two fundamental rights.
Virtually all economic-environmental tradeoffs, moreover, could
be categorized as involving the right to pursue employment or
the acquisition and possession of property.
Finally, the Montana Supreme Court can control the
flexibility that it enjoys through its interpretation of what
triggers constitutional review in the first place. At least some of
the constitutional provisions, for example, would appear to call
for balancing from the very outset. Article IX, Section 1, for
example,
prohibits
only
"unreasonable depletion
and
degradation of natural resources."
Although the term
"unreasonable" could be read narrowly to look only at the nature
and extent of the depletion and degradation, the term's more

135.
136.

MEIC, $i 64.
Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 287, 911 P.2d at 1165.
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traditional legal meaning would call for a balancing of harms
and benefits. 137 The Montana Constitution thus might find any
given level of depletion or degradation "reasonable" if the
societal benefits outweigh the impact on the resource. Even
more absolute terms such as "clean" and "healthful" could be
read to incorporate a balance, although the argument is more
difficult. What a society considers to be "clean" and "healthful"
may depend both on existing conditions and the technological
and economic impediments to improvement. 3 8
What is
considered "healthful" in a coal mine, for example, is unlikely to
be the same as what is considered "healthful" in a bakery.
If and where the Montana Supreme Court chooses to apply
a strong strict scrutiny standard, the inflexibility of the
standard may suggest a narrow interpretation of the
constitutional protections.
Terms such as "clean" are
exceptionally broad and could implicate a wide variety of
activities. At an extreme, "clean" might implicate intentional
agricultural fires, tire yards, or even the upkeep of a suburban
home. The court will need to decide the exact reach of such
terms and, in deciding the reach, may consider the flexibility of
the standard that would be triggered.
2. Implementation and enforcement.
The Montana Supreme Court also must consider the
procedural implications of "constitutionalizing" the environment.
Policy analysts historically have assumed that legislatures have
a comparative advantage both in the fact finding needed to
formulate environmental law and in its implementation. 1 39
Legislatures can form specialized committees to investigate
137. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank. & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
(applying a cost-benefit analysis to determine reasonableness in due process context);
Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1530
(1982) (noting in the context of homeowners' associations that "many judges have viewed
the 'reasonableness' standard as entitling them to undertake an independent cost-benefit
analysis of the decision under review").
138. Cf. Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
642 (1980) ([A] workplace can hardly be considered 'unsafe' unless it threatens the
workers with a significant risk of harm.").
139. See, e.g., William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water
Quality, 52 IOWA L. REV. 186, 195-201 (1966) (discussing the deficiencies of the common
law process in addressing water pollution). Analysts have made similar arguments
regarding other complex institutional litigation. See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L.
Hughes, Efficacy and Engagement: The Remedies Problem Posed by Sheff v. O'Neill and a Proposed Solution, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1115, 1122 (1997) (outlining the criticisms of
new public law litigation).
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issues and develop proposals, hire expert staffs to assist the
committees, and hold broad-ranging hearings with no concern
for evidentiary etiquette. Legislatures also can create and fund
expert administrative agencies to implement and enforce their
policies.
All environmental cases under the Montana Constitution
are likely to present at least some unique procedural issues.
Environmental law is a particularly technical field and typically
requires significant fact collection and evaluation. Some cases,
however, are likely to present more issues than others. Where a
constitutional issue arises in a case such as Cape France
involving only private parties, the court may not have anyone
before it who can adequately represent the broader public
interest. Where the legislature has not yet addressed a field,
courts may have to not only evaluate information but use it to
formulate new policies that both reflect existing environmental
laws at all levels of government and deal with the inevitable
complexities of economic regulation. Courts, moreover, may
have to create totally new institutional structures, although
they often may be able to enlist existing agencies with similar
responsibilities. Even in cases where courts can rely on existing
agencies, however, courts must worry how to get effective
implementation from an agency in the face of budgetary limits
and, in some cases, hostility either from within the agency or
from the legislature.
Courts throughout the United States, of course, have dealt
effectively with similar procedural issues in both a wide array of
institutional litigation (involving school desegregation, prison
reform, mental health care, and educational policy) 140 and in
multi-plaintiff conflicts involving exposure to toxins.14 1 Courts
in these cases have used a number of effective fact-finding and
analytical mechanisms to deal with the often complex technical
issues.
Some judges, for example, have appointed special
masters to evaluate information, consult with public officials,
and develop policies and implementation plans. 142 Other judges

140. Rebell & Hughes, supra note 139, at 1124; Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero
Judge: InstitutionalReform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1995 (1999).
141. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein,
Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97

COLUM.

L.

REV.

2010

(1997)

(discussing the procedural innovations of Judge Jack Weinstein in the Agent Orange
case and the DES cases).
142. Id. at 2013.
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have appointed expert panels to accomplish these tasks. 143 In
some cases, the special masters or expert panels have even held
community-wide hearings and adopted other techniques to
promote public debate and obtain broad information about
public interests and concerns. 144 In other cases, courts have held
hearings that more closely resemble those run by legislatures or
45
administrative agencies than a traditional trial hearing.
In other public litigation, courts also have effectively dealt
with the complexities of implementation and have often
overcome administrative and legislative resistance. Courts will
never feel comfortable actively intervening in the operations of
the other branches of government, but they have intervened
where necessary to enforce constitutional rights. Courts today
oversee a broad range of administrative agencies in institutional
cases. 146 In 1984, approximately a quarter of the nation's state
prisons operated under court order. 147 Courts also are not total
strangers to the creation of new institutional systems. To
implement their decisions in mass tort cases, many judges have
created what Professor Martha Minnow has appropriately called
48
"temporary administrative agencies."
The procedural issues facing the courts also must be viewed
in perspective. While constitutional litigation involving the
environment may raise often difficult procedural issues for the
courts, legislative and administrative processes also are not
ideal. 149 As discussed earlier, political pathologies may prevent
the legislative and administrative branches from addressing
significant environmental problems.
Legislatures and
administrative agencies also do not have the tradition of neutral
reflection found in the judicial system.
Given the procedural and implementation difficulties,
however, courts occasionally may wish to first try to force the
issue back on the legislature. In some institutional litigation,
courts after finding existing policies unconstitutional have
withheld ordering specific relief in order to give the legislative
and executive branches an opportunity to evaluate and choose

143. Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J.
1357, 1371-73 (1991).
144. Minow, supranote 141, at 2014.
145. Sturm, supra note 143, at 1370-71
146. Id. at 1357-58
147. Schlanger, supra note 140, at 2004.
148. Minow, supra note 141, at 2019.
149. Rebell & Hughes, supra note 139, at 1137-38.
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the appropriate policy solutions.150 In other cases, courts have
declared the current policy unconstitutional and issued broad
orders for remediation that have left the details largely to the
other two branches of government.15 1
Through these
approaches, courts can retain the freedom to design and
implement a more specific remedy if the legislative and
executive branches do not act effectively, while hoping that they
ultimately will not need to develop an administrative program of
their own or run the risk of clashing with the other branches.
The potential benefits of deferring initially to legislative and
executive action are particularly strong in the environmental
field given both the breadth of the field and the lack of clear
normative rules to guide judicial remedies.
3. Potential impacts on the legislativeprocess.
A final practical issue raised by cases such as MEIC and
Cape France is the potential effect on the legislative process.
One can tell both positive and negative stories here, and
unfortunately no empirical studies exist to help courts
determine which story is correct. In the positive story, judicial
decisions help create and endow new social norms that influence
legislative action and make future judicial action less necessary.
Significant constitutional decisions may influence the views of
legislators, government officials, and the general public. 15 2 In
issuing a decision such as MEIC, the Montana Supreme Court
signals to society that environmental protection is of
fundamental importance.
In the future, members of the
Montana legislature therefore may be more likely to vote for
strong environmental legislation both because societal norms
have changed and out of fear that the court otherwise will
150. In a major education financing case, for example, the Connecticut Supreme
Court wrote that while it "'is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is,' the fashioning of a constitutional system for
financing elementary and secondary education in the state is not only the proper
function of the legislative department but its expressly mandated duty under the
provisions of the constitution of Connecticut .... The judicial department properly stays
its hand to give the legislative department an opportunity to act." Horton v. Meskill, 376
A.2d 359, 374-75 (Conn. 1977) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703
(1974)).
151. Rebell & Hughes, supra note 139, at 1137-38.
152. See Gregory A. Caldiera, Courts and Public Opinion, in THE AMERICAN COURTS
(J.B. Gates & C.A. Johnson, eds., 1991); Jonathan D. Caspar, The Supreme Court and
National Policymaking, 70 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 50 (1976); Lee Epstein & Thomas G.
Walker, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society: Playing the Reconstruction
Role, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS (Lee Epstein, ed., 1995).
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denigrate their actions in future cases. Legislators also may be
able to resist lobbying by environmental opponents by arguing
that the Montana Constitution demands new legislation.
Judicial decisions, however, also may undermine effective
environmental legislation. In some cases, judicial decisions may
make necessary political compromises more difficult by reducing
legislative options. One potential lesson of MEIC, for example,
is that courts in the future will strictly scrutinize special
exceptions to state environmental standards. In drafting new
environmental protections, therefore, the legislature should
expect that courts may invalidate any exceptions that are not
well justified. However, in many cases, the exceptions may be
politically needed to gain sufficient votes to pass the new
protections. Without the exceptions, special interests may have
enough votes to kill the proposal. The legislature thus might
fail to enact the protections at all.
Although the courts
ultimately might step in and require the protections in a future
constitutional case, effective protections will be delayed and far
more complicated.
Active judicial intervention, moreover, may make it easier
for the legislature to ignore environmental issues.
Many
legislators may be more than happy to avoid making difficult
decisions in the environmental field.
Rather than risk
displeasing particular constituents, legislators therefore may be
more than willing to leave environmental policy to the courts. If
so, active judicial intervention will lead to a reduction rather
than increase in legislative environmental action.
III. CONCLUSION
As I have discussed elsewhere, 153 the normative case for
including self-executing environmental rights in state
constitutions is far from strong. State constitutions might
include self-executing rights or directives, whether involving the
environment or other issues, for at least two reasons. First, an
issue might be too fundamental or principle-driven to delegate to
democratic discretion even in a well-functioning governmental
system.
Second, the state's system of representative
government might suffer from inherent imperfections that make
the legislative or executive branches suspect forums for
addressing and resolving the issue without constitutional

15 Thompson, supra note 2.
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oversight.
Although environmental protection is critically important,
enough disagreement remains over the socially appropriate
levels and types of environmental protection that constitutional
enshrinement of any particular environmental policies seems
premature.
As discussed in Part II, environmental policy
involves troublesome tradeoffs that may be more appropriate for
legislative than for constitutional resolution. The legislative
process suffers from various political pathologies that, as
described earlier, can undermine environmental protection. But
the legislative pathologies for most environmental issues are not
significantly different from or worse than political failings in
other substantive fields. The focus thus should be on improving
the legislative process.
There may be particular environmental issues where the
normative argument for constitutional intervention is stronger.
Environmental issues that involve future generations, such as
the depletion of exhaustible resources, the endangerment of
species, global climate change, and the use of long-lived toxics,
are one example. The traditional political process does not
account fully for the interests of future generations, arguing for
some form of intergenerational constitutional protection. As
consensus forms around minimum environmental rights, the
argument for constitutionalizing these rights also will grow. In
the meantime, however, courts should be cautious not to employ
existing constitutional provisions in a manner that shuts off
valuable democratic debate concerning the environment. The
courts can valuably use existing constitutional provisions to
improve environmental policymaking, but only if the courts
recognize both the benefits and risks of trying to
constitutionalize the environment.
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